Once More on Adam Smith's Earthquake Teaser

D. S. WRIGHT writes Book Review: "A Conflict Of Visions" (Part 1) in Daily Kos HERE

“Here Sowell focuses on the notion of the limitations of human nature or rather a vision that factors in our inherent inability to change certain attributes about ourselves, a natural constraint. Sowell illustrates this in a unique way by highlighting the most cruel application of this vision - he references Adam Smith's Theory On Moral Sentiments in particular the passage claiming that a European man would be more concerned and distressed by the loss of his pinky than if all of China was swallowed by the sea. I have to give style points here, this is a considerably bold reference if not a preemptive strike on the rejoinder to the constrained vision - that if people acted so dispassionate towards their fellow man they would all be selfish bores. If, as King Henri-Quatre claimed, Paris is worth a mass then surely China is worth a pinky.

Sowell trumpets this very eventuality by selecting (or is our busy bee pre-selecting?) an example that discards any care for self-flattery and moves on to make a larger point, principally made by Smith though also buttressed by Burke and Hamilton, that the constrained vision casts man as deeply and irredeemably narcissistic. To Smith, as relayed by Sowell, people are incapable of loving one's neighbor as oneself and only make sacrifices to abstract concepts such as moral principles and personal honor.”

Comment
This article caught my eye because it is based in a ‘massage’ of the facts about the alleged views that Adam Smith supposedly expressed in his Moral Sentiments (1759) that “a European man would be more concerned and distressed by the loss of his pinky than if all of China was swallowed by the sea”, which is about a rather too complex presentation of Professor Sowell’s on A Conflict of Visions”.

From the review (follow the link), I confess that I had difficulty following the argument of the point made by D. S. Wright in this review of Thomas Sowell’s book. But in so far as it may be an important contribution to the outer-reaches of philosophy, I think we should clear up what exactly Adam Smith said and what it meant.

Either D. S Wright or Thomas Sowell misrepresents what Adam Smith actually wrote; it is not clear which of them is the main source of the error embedded in ‘quoting’ Smith’s chapter ‘of Duty’ in Moral Sentiments. Smith makes the point that “a man of humanity in Europe”, considering the situation where “the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake” (TMS, Part III, chapter 3, paragraph 4: 136) and discussed the possible reactions of that “man of humanity”. In short, it is a ‘mind experiment’ of the kind that tutors of young university students of moral philosophy, some as young as 14 at that time in Scotland, might happily express to get them thinking morally, and, typically for Smith, he offers some alternative choices for them to think about.

One reaction, is for him to ‘express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people’, which would not ruffle anybody’s doubts – would not we all think thus? But Smith goes on to push his mind game further. He suggests that a “man of speculation” would contemplate how the disaster would affect “the commerce of Europe”.

Modern readers need to bear in mind that this is not a 24-hour news channel, with news within minutes of such an event happening. This was 18th-century Britain, with a sea-journey time of over a year for the news of such an earth quake to arrive in Europe. Smith then increases the pressure, no doubt grabbing the close attention of his young listeners, suggesting that when the “fine philosophy was over” and the “human sentiments had been once fairly expressed”, this European man of humanity” would “pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose of his diversion, with the same ease and tranquility, as if no such accident had happened”. No doubt, the ‘know-alls’ and young cynics among the audience, would smirk knowingly the way the world works.

To force his apparent point, Smith goes on to claim of the "man of humanity" that ‘The most frivilous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real disturbance”, and twists the knife deeper by further asserting that “If he was to lose his little finger tomorrow, he would not sleep tonight; but provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting, than the paltry misfortune of his own”.

Smith probably had the wrapt attention of his audience at this point. But he is not finished yet. He poses the likely consequence, that if this “man of humanity” was offered the chance to “prevent this paltry misfortune to himself” (by the loss of his little finger”) to avert the hundred million victims of the distant earthquake, would he be willing to sacrifice his “little finger” instead? By now, his audience is of the mind that this was a no contest: the “man of humanity” would not sacrifice his finger avert the distant disaster.

But was this Smith’s point? It certainly is taken that way, judging by the number of times this is what most readers continue to think every time there is a distant earthquake in the news, today, and Smith’s first part of the quotation is reproduced as if that is what he said.

This is what Adam Smith actually wrote here:

“Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it. But what makes this difference? When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble? When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self–love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration.”

It is quite a different Smithian conclusion! Hence, I am disappointed that either Thomas Sowell or his reviewer, butchered the quotation from Adam Smith, and gave spurious credence to whatever point they were making.

I hope readers from now will correct false quotations from Smith on “distant earthquakes” and how a “man of humanity” would react in practice.

[I am grateful to Sandra Peart (University of Richmond, Virginia) for pointing out to me the pitfalls from misreading Adam Smith.]

Adam Smith on Earthquakes and his 'Little Finger' Parable

With the awefull Japanese earthquake in the news, I expect a flurry of Blog reports misquoting Adam Smith on the ‘Chinese Earthquake’ parable that appeared in Moral Sentiments (1759) four years after the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 that caused a public debate on its causes – the Catholic Bishop said it was God’s anger at the sins committed by the residents of Lisbon, a notion mocked by Voltaire in his novel, Candide.

I thought it appropriate to comment early, rather than await the inevitable flurry of posts from the “Book of Instant Quotes from Adam Smith for Any Day’s Media Topics for Columnists Needing to Appear Erudite While Mocking Markets”, and feel obliged to respond with what Adam Smith actually said instead.

The normal Smith on Earthquakes version goes something like this:

“Adam Smith famously wrote of 'a man of humanity in Europe' who would not 'sleep tonight' if 'he was to lose his little finger tomorrow' but would 'snore with the most profound security' if a hundred million of his Chinese brethren were 'suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, "because" he had never seen them.”

Left like that the quote can be misleading, as I have commented several times on Lost Legacy over the past few years. However, try this:

‘But for us in today’s relentless 24-hour News-Cycle TV world, the Chinese are no longer invisible, living at the outside edge of what David Hume called the concentric circles of our empathy. Last summer's earthquake in China, whose tragic aftermath was instantly transmitted onto our screens, was met by the rest of the world not with indifference but with empathy and a profound sense of moral obligation to the Chinese victims. It was globalization's finest hour’ (a more accurate quote from Jagdish Bagwati of Columbia University, New York

Regular readers may recall that I have commented on the misuses of this paragraph from Moral Sentiments on several occasions. The problem comes from reading only part of the paragraph and not reading all of it. [Confession: some years ago, Dean, Professor Sandra Peart, of the University of Richmond, Virginia, corrected me, politely, of course - Sandra is a paragon of scholarly good manners - on my earlier misreading of the paragraph.] **

Far from Adam Smith making his 'little finger' point and leaving it as quoted, he goes on to say:

“Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befal himself would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own.”

Most commentators stop there and do not read on, and thereby jump to the wrong conclusions. Smith, they conclude asks: “if ‘the man of humanity’, obsessed with saving his ‘paltry’ finger, of which he is highly emotional about, could save ‘his brethren’ in China from the earthquake disaster, but only at the cost of losing his little finger, what would he do?”

Well, if he rolls over and snores after dreadful news of an earthquake it’s obvious: he keeps his little finger! But does he?

Read on and I think you will agree that what Smith says next turns the whole, somewhat cynical, assertion he begins with on its head, and treats us to one of his thunderous affirmations of the moral spirit, which he finds in human kind when exposed to the society of his fellows:

“To prevent, therefore, this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them? Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it. But what makes this difference? When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble? When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration. It is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever relates to ourselves, and the natural misrepresentations of self-love can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us the propriety of generosity and the deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves. It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind, which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters.” (TMS III.4.4: pp 137-38)

The whole (very long) paragraph is an example of Smith, the educator, at work (Moral Sentiments [1759] was based on the lectures on ethics that he taught at Glasgow University (1751-64).

The shocking earthquake in Smith’s time that had a dramatic affect on European men of letters occurred on 1 November 1755 in Lisbon, Portugal, and this probably inspired him to develop it as an imaginary Chinese example of the appropriate moral conduct. China in Smith’s day was about as far as you could get from Europe (it took a year’s sailing to get there from Britain and the same time to get back, plus the time spent there, while Lisbon was but a short day or two away. Distant China was about as far as you could get in popular imagination, which suited his example.

The clue is in his early reference to the ‘man of humanity’ who performed the subject of his questions about the little finger, and reading it leaves no doubt in a reader’s mind of Smith's low opinion of any such man preferring his little finger to the death of 100 million people.

In sum, the benevolent generosity of the genuine concerns and sacrifices to send assistance to the victims of the more recent earthquake in Japan does not contrast with Adam Smith’s parable of the reaction of an 18th-century ‘man of humanity’; the same passion for others is common to people both then and now. Those who seek to make an ideological point against Adam Smith (usually sneering about free markets as well), are mischievous, where not downright dishonest.

Professor Bhagwati’s broader point was that globalisation has not made people less caring than in more ancient times and it doesn't need a truncated 'little finger' example to make that point.

In fact, globalisation makes it easier to mobilise real resources (not just sympathy) and get them to Japan in hours and over prolonged period of days and weeks. This was impossible in the 18th century. By the time that news of the earthquake reached Europe from China, or New Zealand, it would be 'old news', well over two years old.

If you see any such misinterpretations of Adam Smith on Earthquakes and the ‘little finger’ paragraph, write or post a rebuttal in your own words (or mine) and certainly in Smith’s.

** Message for ambitious younger readers hoping to climb the ‘greasy pole’ of academe: try not to be shy of acknowledging the (inevitable) scholarly errors as you join the Republic of Letters in case your ‘rivals’ put you down. It is unedifying to see people refusing to acknowledge errors, worse, trying to deny them. Your ‘rivals’ will whisper against you anyway, but your seniors will note your sense of scholarly integrity and your defence of when you are right will impress your colleagues.

Ayn Rand versus Adam Smith

Art Carden posts (22 April) on the Blog: Division of Labour a report of a debate between Yaron Brook and James Otteson on Ayn Rand and Adam Smith. Dan Klein asked Art to ask Yaron Brook to answer a question and what follows is Yaron Brook’s reply and a number of comments. Here is the question and to read the responses and comments follow the link HERE:


"Take Smith's famous thought experiment about -- by some fantastic unstated mechanism -- you ("a man of humanity in Europe", in 1759) could prevent an earthquake in China by cutting off your pinky. Smith says that of course you would do so, and then addresses why. Yorum, would you cut off your pinky? Assume that knowledge of the whole affair would necessarily remain entire personal. If yes, and you claim to square that with "selfishness," aren't you using words in an opportunistic and unmanageable way?"

Ayn Rand Institute's Onkar Ghate responds:

“The question’s undertone is that everyone “just knows” it’s right to cut off your finger. Moral theory’s task is to rationalize this incontrovertible conclusion; Rand’s theory can’t, however, because it’s an abuse of language to call the action selfish.
But it’s a mistake to think that Rand’s ethics begins with the moral beliefs that happen to saturate the culture, not with reality. True, it would be an abuse of language to label the action Smith envisions “selfish”: it is self-sacrificial. Precisely for this reason, Rand’s ethics would pronounce the action immoral.

To understand the radical difference between Smith and Rand here, one must grasp the principles at work. Consider first the details of Smith’s imagined scenario in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III.I.46.

If a “man of humanity,” Smith writes, heard about a devastating earthquake in China (that has no personal effect on him), he would feel sorrow. But if he didn’t directly witness the disaster, he would sleep undisturbed; indeed, he would feel more disturbed by “the most frivolous disaster that could befall him,” say the prospect of losing his finger the next day.

But now suppose, Smith says, the man were not a passive bystander but an active participant. Would he choose himself over others? “To prevent . . . this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them?” Smith’s view is that no man could be so monstrous. And Smith’s question is: Why is our chosen action so different from our passive reaction?” [Continued]

Comment
Follow the link to see how the debate unfolds. It well worth the effort. I regularly quote Adam Smith on the earthquake in China and what the ‘little finger’ episode means.

BTW, book marking Division of Labour is an excellent way t read thoughtful economics.

On Casting the First Stone ...

Richard Beck, Associate Professor and experimental psychologist at Abilene Christian University, writes on his Bog, Experimental Theology HERE:

"HE WILL SNORE WITH THE MOST PROFOUND SECURITY OVER THE RUIN OF A HUNDRED MILLIONS OF HIS BRETHREN..."

“Adam Smith (yes, the Adam Smith) on the most problematic facet of human moral psychology, how the incomprehensible suffering of humanity cannot compete with our workday hassles and preoccupations:

[Richard quotes the first part only of the passage from Moral Sentiments from ‘Let us suppose that the great Empire of China… through to: ‘and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own’ (TMS III.3.4: 136-7.

He does not complete the passage, which is unfortunate because this gives him and his readers a totally unbalanced view of what Adam Smith actually said. It is also a fairly common way in which truncated quotations, often torn out of context, have contributed to Adam Smith’s Lost Legacy.]

Comment

To assist a more balanced understanding, here is the missing half of the quotation that Richard failed to offer his readers:

‘To prevent, therefore, this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them? Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it. But what makes this difference? When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble? When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self–love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration. kIt is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever relates to ourselves, and the natural misrepresentations of self–love can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us the propriety of generosity and the deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves. It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind, which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters (TMS III.3.5: 137).

This reverses the apparently somewhat cynical view of human behaviour from the first part quoted by Richard and, presumably misunderstood by his Blog readers. Smith held a rounded, moral view, of how 'a man of humanity' would really react to the tragedy in China (then a year or more sailing time to get there - and the same back to Britain too).

Recent earthquakes in China and other places are known within seconds via modern media and the responses from 'people of humanity' are in accord with Adam Smith's assessments.

However, the kidnapping behaviour of certain 'Christian sects' from the US (and France) leaves much to be desired.

Recognition in High-Places Of Smith's Real Views on Earthquake Disasters

Brad DeLong post prolifically on his blog:
“The Semi-Daily Journal of Economist J. Bradford DeLong: “Grasping Reality with Opposable Thumbs” -
(“A Fair, Balanced, and Reality-Based Look at the World”)from the
Department of Economics, U.C. Berkeley HERE:

“I Wonder If Matthew Bishop of the Economist and Michael Green Have Apoogized to Their Readers and to Adam Smith Yet...”

Gavin Kennedy, on quotations out of context.

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps?”

Comment
Yes, the short to-the-point one-liner is Brad Delong signature post.

On this occasion, he refers to Lost Legacy's post of 16 Saturday:

“Adam Smith on Earthquakes and a "Man of Humanity"

Matthew Bishop, US Business Editor of The Economist and Michael Green write for Philanthrocapitalism Blog and have produced, I hope in innocence, what amounts, by implication, so far as their readers are concerned, to a scurrilous slur on Adam Smith.” HERE http://adamsmithslostlegacy.com/2010/01/adam-smith-on-earthquakes-and-man-of.html

Which, incidentally, followed Friday's post:

“Another Half-Quotation from Adam Smith

In The Australian, Tim Soutphomassane, under the name, ‘The Philosopher’ asks:

Should we donate more to earthquake victims?”

But first, my thanks to Brad Delong, the doyen among economics bloggers, for pointing his readers to Lost Legacy.

To succeed in countering the many errors and alien beliefs about Adam Smith that circulate among economists, including those at the very top of the profession who publish regularly in the media, as well as in refereed journals, Lost Legacy needs all the positive publicity it can attract.

Another Half-Quotation from Adam Smith

In The Australian, Tim Soutphomassane, under the name, ‘The Philosopher’ asks:

Should we donate more to earthquake victims? (HERE):

The Philosopher (philosophercolumn@gmail.com) takes his text from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759'), and comments:

“Adam Smith, better-known as the father of modern economics, may appear an unlikely source of philosophical guidance. But in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith asked his readers to imagine an earthquake swallowing up the whole of China. While "a man of humanity in Europe" would be moved to express his melancholy, he would, Smith argued, ultimately return untroubled to his ordinary life.

"If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren."

Smith's observations have perhaps lost part of their sharpness. Technology has made a mockery of distance. In the 18th century, the images and sounds of an earthquake's devastation could not have been broadcast into the living rooms of those on the other side of the world, as they are today.

Even so, for all the horror we may feel about the Haitians' hardship, how many of us have watched the late-night news update, only to slip quietly to bed for a good night's sleep? Maybe Smith had a point.

I do not mean to make anyone feel guilty, or more guilty, about not feeling deeply enough about the plight of the Haitians. Nor am I for a moment suggesting that we should withhold assistance or charity. If one has the means to do so, one should be giving generously to the Haiti aid appeals. Governments can afford to be magnanimous in such times.

However, Smith highlighted a truth about the limits of human sympathy. Our sense of solidarity with those who suffer is strongest when we consider someone else as "one of us" where "us" means something smaller and more local than the human race. Philosophers of obligation would remind us that we owe a special concern for the welfare of our families and compatriots.”

Comment
Regular readers of Lost Legacy will know what Tim Soutphomassane has done. He has taken a truncated quotation from Adam Smith and then made a case without bothering – or even not knowing – what Smith said next, in the same paragraph.

By misleading his readers in The Australian, a newspaper with a hight reputation as a serious and authoritative source (certainly a cut above the usual tabloids) he makes a few dollars from traducing the reputation of a real moral philosopher;

Here is the rest of the quotation about how “man of humanity” would really act in response to a calamity of an earthquake, in contrast to how Smith draws his listeners into a discussion, using the earthquake as an example (China was a year’s sailing from Britain at the time):

“Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it. But what makes this difference? When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble? When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration. It is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever relates to ourselves, and the natural misrepresentations of self-love can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us the propriety of generosity and the deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves. It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind, which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters.” (TMS III.3.4: 136-37)

Quite a different picture of the ‘man of humanity’, eh?

I suggest that Tim Soutphomassane read a little more before pontificating about the point that Smith was making.

UPDATE:
This comment arrived Monay 25 January but got 'lost' in publishing it:

"Extremely helpful towards a basic understanding of Smith's famous quote; thank you." (JMJanssen)

Thank you J. M. Jansen for writing to Lost Legacy. Much appreciated. Gavin

Adam Smith on Earthquakes and a "Man of Humanity"

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Matthew Bishop, US Business Editor of The Economist and Michael Green write for Philanthrocapitalism Blog HERE and have produced, I hope in innocence, what amounts, by implication, so far as their readers are concerned, to a scurrilous slur on Adam Smith:

“Philanthrocapitalism and the Heart Strings”

“Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connection with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment… And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real disturbance.”

Those words, written by the great British economist Adam Smith, seem strikingly wide of the mark at the moment, as millions of people around the world respond with generosity to the terrible misfortune that has befallen the people of Haiti. Twitter and Facebook are churning with tips on how to give and to whom to give. Governments, businesses and individuals the world over are all opening their wallets to help.

Although sometimes caricatured as a champion of selfishness for extolling the power of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, Smith’s quote comes from his lesser-known work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which he argued that it is our sympathy for others that motivates our good deeds. In the world without telephones and televisions that existed when he was writing, catastrophes on the other side of the world were abstract stories; today, we can see the suffering of others and do something about it. For that reason, Smith would not have been surprised by the way the public has responded to this latest crisis, and would have celebrated this as progress for humankind.

Smith would also have noted with pleasure that a massive earthquake in China in 2008 led to a dramatic change in attitudes to giving there, where the government had previously been hostile to philanthropy. Yet he might also have worried that the economy’s invisible heart led to philanthropic funds being misallocated by the surge of sympathy after high profile disasters, which often attract more money and in-kind gifts than can be used effectively on the ground, at the expense of less compelling but more effective uses of the donations.”

Comment
The above quotation comes from Moral Sentiments (1759) and, unfortunately it is only part of this paragraph that is often quoted by quotation-chasing, media folk in a hurry to make their point when earthquakes are in the news.

‘Tis a pity that Matthew or Michael did not quote the rest of the paragraph – maybe it was only partly quoted from their book of Smith quotations – for they would have gotten a whole new perspective on the Adam Smith they think they knew.

Here it is, right after where their truncated quote ends: “…would occasion a more real disturbance”:

“Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it. But what makes this difference? When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble? When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration. It is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever relates to ourselves, and the natural misrepresentations of self-love can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us the propriety of generosity and the deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves. It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind, which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters” (TMS III.3.5: 136-37).

I suggest this shows a different take on Adam Smith’s insightful comment on how “a man of humanity” would react to an earthquake in distant China (then a year’s sailing from Britain and the same back).

Yes, the world has grown smaller today, but the same human spirit, extolled by Smith, is evident in what follows in the near-by Caribbean. I would wish that Matthew and Michael would spread that message about Adam Smith’s legacy on such occasions.

Adam Smith on Earthquakes and 'the man of humanity'

Stephen F. DeAngelis writes Globalization and Morality : Enterprise Resilience Management Blog HERE:

This issue carries a report of the debate over globalisation, in particular a report by Jagdish Bhagwati, the famous professor at Columbia University, New York, who has spearheaded the defence of global free-trade in academe and public commentaries.

As usual, I agree with almost everything Bhagwati writes (I have often called for him to be awarded a Nobel prize) with a reservation about this paragraph:

“Bhagwati goes on to reflect on another perspective of globalization's connectivity.
"Adam Smith famously wrote of 'a man of humanity in Europe' who would not 'sleep tonight' if 'he was to lose his little finger tomorrow' but would 'snore with the most profound security' if a hundred million of his Chinese brethren were 'suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, "because" he had never seen them.' For us, the Chinese are no longer invisible, living at the outside edge of what David Hume called the concentric circles of our empathy. Last summer's earthquake in China, whose tragic aftermath was instantly transmitted onto our screens, was met by the rest of the world not with indifference but with empathy and a profound sense of moral obligation to the Chinese victims. It was globalization's finest hour."

Comment
Regular readers may recall that I have commented on the misuses of this paragraph from Moral Sentiments on several occasions. The problem comes from reading part of the paragraph and not taking in the rest of it. I was corrected some years ago by Professor Sandra Peart on my misreading (politely, of course; Sandra is a paragon of scholarly manners) of the passage.

Far from Adam Smith making his point and leaving it there (the bit that Jagdish quotes to make a good counter-point to Smith’s apparent speculation with the real life reaction of ‘people of humanity’ after the recent and very real earthquake in China. It’s a good point. But it is unfair to Adam Smith. Here’s why?

The piece Jagdish Bhagwati quotes follows in full:

“Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befal himself would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own.”
And now the true account of Smith’s alleged cynical attitude in his thought experiment. I say, alleged because those who do not read on jump to the wrong conclusions. Smith asks: “if ‘the man of humanity’, obsessed with saving his ‘paltry’ finger, of which he is highly emotional about, could save ‘his brethren’ in China from the earthquake disaster, but at the cost of losing his little finger, what would he do?”

Well, if he rolls over and snores at the earthquake news it’s obvious: he keeps his little finger! But does he? Read on and find out. I think you will agree that what Smith says next turns the whole, somewhat cynical, assertion he begins with on its head, and treats us to one of his thunderous affirmations of the moral spirit, which he finds in human kind when exposed to the society of his fellows:

“To prevent, therefore, this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them? Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it. But what makes this difference? When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble? When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration. It is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever relates to ourselves, and the natural misrepresentations of self-love can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us the propriety of generosity and the deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves. It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind, which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters.” (TMS III.4.4: pp 137-38; 1872, Kessinger Rare Reprints edition, p 119-20)

However, the whole paragraph is an example of Smith the educator at work (remember The Theory Moral Sentiments [1759] is written up from Smith’s lecture notes in ethics that he taught at Glasgow University (1751-64).

The shocking earthquake in Smith’s time that had a dramatic affect on European men of letters occurred on 1 November 1755 in Lisbon, Portugal, and this probably inspired him to develop it as a China example (the Lisbon earthquake sorely affected Voltaire for example). Portugal is a short sea voyage from Britain; China, in those days, was more than a year away in sea time, and over a year back, and was about as far as you could get in popular imagination, which suited his example.

The clue is in his early reference to the ‘man of humanity’ who performed the subject of his questions about the little finger, leaving no doubt in a reader’s mind of the appropriate opinions of any such man preferring his little finger to the death of 100 million people.

In sum, the benevolent generosity of the genuine concerns and sacrifices to send assistance to the victims of the more recent earthquake in China does not contrast with Adam Smith’s parable the reaction of an 18th-century ‘man of humanity’; the same passion for others is common to people both then and now.

Professor Bhagwati should find another example and leave Adam Smith out of it if he is only going to quote a part of the paragraph.

The broader point is that globalisation has not made people less caring than in ancient times and it doesn't need a 'little finger' example to make that point. In fact globalisation makes it easier to mobilise real resources (not just sympathy) and get them to China in hours and days, which was an impossibility in the 18th century. By the time that news of the earthquake reached Europe it would be 'old news', over a year old.