Jacob Viner's Theological Gloss to his Error on Adam Smith's Use of the Invisible-Hand Metaphor

Among other items I have been reading this week, I came across this item:
Jacob Viner on the invisible hand in Smith in (1972) ‘The Role of Providence in the Social Order: an Essay in Intellectual History’, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

‘Adam Smith’s system of thought, including his economics, is not intelligible if one disregards the role he assigns in i tto teleological elements, to the “invisible hand”.’ (p 82)

‘In his economic analysis Smith operates from the categorical premise that the economic relations between man are on effect fundamentally impersonal, anonymous, infinitely “distant” so that the sentiments with the one exception of “justice”, remain dormant, are not aroused into action’ (82).

Viner goes on to consider ‘commercial transactions carried out by professional merchants of whom, one say, is resident in England and the other in Turkey, and the only communication between them is through equally anonymous intermediaries, or by mail. Smith, however, in his general treatment of the market, although often not when he is dealing with particular cases, writes as if he accepts as realistic the same psychological assumptions when he is considering the relationships of master and servant, landlord and tenant-farmer, employer and employee, as when he is discussing foreign trade.’

Comment
What struck me as I read Jabob Viner’s take on the invisible hand was how different it was from my own take on Smith’s idea of the ‘anonymity’ of the links in the supply chain, even when fairly simple, let alone when more complex. The products that a merchant purchased, from home suppliers of goods as agents from those merchants residing abroad, one or two links from the merchant either before and after his own face-to-face contact with his suppliers and his buyers, none of whom need be final seller or buyers (because merchants in the supply chain may be subject to many suppler and buyer links before or after those he deals with directly) would not be anonymous.

A merchant buyer in England buys through agents - he has to know those whom he deals with if only to view the merchandise or to judge the visible prices quoted. He does not address a letter, let alone his money, to ‘anybody in Turkey’. The seller in Turkey may buy his produce from other local Turkish sub-merchants, original manufacturers, and perhaps through their agents along the supply chain. The goods purchased are carried as cargo in the ships of merchant traders and offloaded to port-agents in England, and then carried forward to our merchant. In short, each link in the chain is in contact with the next link, and for that transaction the traders are very real and known, and not ‘anonymous’.

Smith’s point was that there is no need for the merchant in England to know the people in the links in a supply chain two or more steps before in the links. Indeed, in complex markets, that anonymity is productive, but it is not a mystery. In the first instance, he only needs to know the ones he buys from and sells to directly.

However, if a merchant suspects (because he does not know) that the character and probity of the persons in the links he deals with face-to-face, because of possible fraud or unreliability, this can inhibit his participation in trade, especially of foreign trade, where recourse to reliable justice may be difficult. He might very well try to go 'behind' the person he deals with in England, to make contact with his foreign suppliers and try to ‘cut out’ that person in the supply chain (perhaps be visiting the foreign country himself or through a trusted agent). If the risks are too high (he is risk averse) and if he has other options, such as access to domestic trade supply chains, he could exercise the virtue of prudence and only trade domestically.

Now that was the precise point that Adam Smith was making in his use of the ‘invisible-hand’ metaphor in Wealth Of Nations (IV.ii.1-9:452-56) to show how some, but not all, merchants, concerned for the security of their capital when applied to the foreign trades, preferred to invest at lower risks domestically, which unintentionally added to domestic ‘annual revenue and employment’ (the whole is the sum of its parts). It was their risk aversion that Smith referred to by the IH metaphor (their 'security' was the metaphor's object) . What is in someone's head as a motivation is 'invisible' - we cannot see into their heads; we can only feel, like the wind, it's affects. They can decide (privately, without fuss) to either trade foreign or domestically, or undertake a bit of both. A some merchants, but not all, initiate and continue with foreign trade, which in Britain's case in Smith's time and afterwards amounted to a significant part of what today we call the GNP.

The sentiment affecting their behaviour was the sentiment that Deidre McClosky rightly called the bourgeois virtue of prudence. This virtue is not, as Jacob Viner suggested, ‘infinitely “distant”’ from all sentiments, except ‘justice’. Viner made that claim to give ‘teleological' elements, to the “invisible hand”’, which is a theological gloss covering his incorrect appraisal of Adam Smith’s use of the IH metaphor.

[Note to Regular Readers: I am occupied at present in the first draft of my Essay on 'Adam Smith On Religion' and posts just now are less frequent than normal. Please have patience. I shall try to post more frequently after the 'holidays'.]

"The Hesitant Hand" by Steven Medema: Review, Part One:

Steve Madema opens his book, The Hesitant Hand, with a Prologue that spells out where he is going with his main theme on the part played by self-interest in society as a whole and how philosophers like Adam Smith and those before him approached the question. With an economy of style he gets down to business quickly.

Smith was not the first, nor the only, philosopher to focus on self-interest. Decades before 1776 (Wealth Of Nations), others had made explicit reference to self-interest. My first slight concern occurs here because Steve associates these interests of others and Smith with laissez-faire, a uniquely French term, which was not mentioned by Adam Smith in any of his works or correspondence, though he was familiar with it from his contacts with the French Physiocrats and their publications.

There is today an assumption that Smith’s preference for competition and reduced interventions of the kind practised by European governments in their mercantile legislative policies was in essence a policy of laissez-faire, which, strictly, it was not. Not all Physiocrats advocated laissez-faire – in fact some of their policies were interventionist, as were some of Smith’s.

It could be argued that such quibbles were outwith the thematic realm of Steve’s book – he wants to get on with his narrative, absent such scholarly niceties – and ordinarily I would agree with him, but just as the term had specific meanings for Vincent de Gournay, who popularised the term in his debate with Colbert, the Finance Minister of Louse XIV (“laissez-faire, laissez- passer”), about freedom from the stifling regulations pertaining to the conduct of commerce in France, it has come to have specific meanings for modern economists of the extreme libertarian school – the absence of government - neither of which can be said to be particularly Smithian in content or application.

However, Steve's Prologue is a masterly entre to what follows, especially in Chapter 1, “Adam Smith and His Ancestors” (5-25). This opens with Adam Smith and “an invisible hand” which would tend to “harmonise individual and social interests” and “attempts by the state to interfere with this would run counter to the national interest”. “Competition”, says Steve, “was hampered on all sides” (5).

Much of the legal structure was inimical to economic growth and this structure was the creation of governments following, or initiating, assertions about appropriate economic policy, mixed with religious or contemporary moral philosophies, from the
Greeks onwards.

Steve marches through this history at a brisk, readable pace, which economists who read the chapter would do well to take on board (or be reminded of). Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Scholastics, are buried in continuing economic thinking, despite the best efforts of modern economists to purge anything that cannot be modelled mathematically.

Rulers prefer subjects who submit to their rule by identifying their self-interest with the Sovereign, and still today they seek enforcement of their writ where their subjects do not do what is wanted of them (in Britain and the US we have petty bureaucrats, in Iran we have black-clothed thugs on motor-cycles, in Pakistan, police with canes, and China their versions of the Gulag). Learn about the past and you understand the present.

Steve covers Scholastic thinking neatly, with comments on much Christian thinking (the will of God) and how it related to, then, contemporary problems of taxation, the sovereign’s appetite for expenditure, regal lifestyles, monuments to their greatness, and the morality of borrowing (usury debates). Into this mix the self-interest of commoners and crown conflicted (the king debased his currency and his subjects ‘clipped’ it), as they did in debates over private and public property (sound familiar in echoes of the tragedy of the commons?).

As the power of the state increased from the 16th century, Steve notes that the influence of theologians declined and that of merchants rose (11), the latter with a self-interested motive to try to influence government policy, based on the well-known (and perpetuating knack for presenting their otherwise blatant self-interest in terms that appealed to the ‘national interest’, which was of greater concern to the sovereign than the petty wishes of seedy merchants). It was, and still is, the way of the lobbyist.

A small quibble emerges for me in Steve’s assertion that the term ‘mercantilism’ was coined in the 1760s (11); I have always understood that it originated from the German word in late 19th century and transferred to English from the late 19th century.

Of no doubt though, the critique of mercantile policy emerged in the late 18th century, particularly in Smith’s Wealth Of Nations in Book IV. While often presented as a critique of bullion accumulation, it goes much deeper than that, summed as the policies associated with what Hume called ‘Jealousy of Trade’.

Steve’s account of the debate is another example of his masterly exposition style which makes the subject interesting (11-13).

The subject is a clear example of the self-interested actions of individual merchants, in alliance with legislators and those who influenced them, that were, in Smith’s and in others’ view, contrary to the national interest.

Self-interest, clearly, does not necessarily result in some way in the public interest (and it remains a mystery to me why proponents of such a view continue to attribute it to Adam Smith – presumably they have never read Book IV!).

If you are not sure what the issues were (and, regrettably still are today) in the mercantile policy debate, Steve’s exposition will remove all doubts and uncertainties. He quotes from the inimitable Jacob Viner to great effect (13) on the appeal of mercantile advocates to Providence for chauvinistic support for their doctrines.

Moving on to the Physiocrats and the economic policy regime of Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619-83), Steve uses 17th-century France as a case study in all that was wrong with mercantile interventionist policy. He discusses their strong points (identified by Adam Smith, who admired them personally) and their ‘errors’ - the superiority of agriculture (produit net) versus the ‘sterility’ of manufactures. They related their ideas to their version of ‘natural law’. (15) As Steve points out the Physiocratic programme required a strong state led by ‘experts’.

This brings Steve to Adam Smith and his works.
However, apologies (I am supposed to be on holiday, and family demands on my attention interrupt my section on Adam Smith - I shall finish it tomorrow and post it then.

Adam Smith Not an Advocate of Laissez-Faire

Sir Courtney N Blackman’s speech is reported in the Trinidad and Tobago Review , entitled

“THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE NEO-LIBERAL PARADIGM”, HERE: which contains the following paragraph:

“Neo-Liberalism is the direct descendant of the laissez-faire paradigm inaugurated by Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in 1776 and elaborated by successive Classical economists, culminating with Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics in 1920. The Classical paradigm failed to deal effectively with the Great Depression of the 1930s and was superseded by the Keynesian paradigm.”

Comment
Laissez-faire did not feature in Adam Smith’s Wealth Of Nations. He did not agree that laissez-faire was an appropriate policy – that came from some of the French Physiocrats – and identified many areas where it should not apply in a commercial society.

I posted the following list last month (from Jacob Viner), but its worth reminding readers of his stance:

"● The Navigation Acts, blessed by Smith under the assertion that ‘defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence’; (WN464)
● Sterling marks on plate and stamps upon linen and woollen cloth (WN138-9)
● Enforcement of contracts by a system of justice; (WN720)
● Wages to be paid in money, not goods;
● Regulations of paper money in banking; (WN437)
● Obligations to build party wars to prevent the spread of fire; (WN324)
● Premiums and other encouragements to advance the linen and woollen industries’; (TMS185)
● ‘Police’, or preservation of the ‘cleanliness of roads, streets, and to prevent the bad effects of corruption and putrifying substances’;
● ensuring the ‘cheapness or plenty [of provisions]’; (LJ6; 331)
● patrols by town guards, fire fighters and of other hazardous accidents; (LJ331-2)
● Erecting and maintaining certain public works and public institutions intended to facilitate commerce (roads, bridges, canals and harbours); (WN723)
● Coinage and the Mint; (WN478; 1724)
● Post office; (WN724)
● Regulation of institutions, such as company structures (joint stock companies; co-partneries, regulated companies); (WN731-58)
● Temporary monopolies, including copyright, patents, of fixed duration; (WN754)
● Education of youth (‘village schools’, curriculum design); (WN758-89)
● Education of people of all ages (tythes or land tax) (WN788);
● Encouragement of ‘the frequency and gaiety of publick diversions’; (WN796)
● The prevention of ‘leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive disease’ from spreading among the population; (WN787-88)
● Encouragement of martial exercises; (WN786)
● Registration of mortgages for land, houses, and boats over two tons; (WN861, 863)
● Government restrictions on interest for borrowing (usury laws) to overcome investor ‘stupidity’; (WN356-7)
● Laws against banks issuing low-denomination promissory notes; (WN324)
● Natural liberty may be breached if individuals ‘endanger the security of the whole society’; (WN324)
● Limiting ‘free exportation of corn’ only ‘in cases of the most urgent necessity’ (‘dearth’ turning into ‘famine’); (WN539)
● Moderate export taxes on wool exports for government revenue; (WN 879)

Jacob Viner concluded, unsurprisingly, that Adam Smith was not a doctrinaire laissez-faire advocate.

[From Viner, J. 1928. ‘Adam Smith and Laissez-faire’, In ‘Adam Smith, 1776-1928: Lectures to Commemorate the Sesquicentennial of the Publication of Wealth Of Nations, p 53, August M. Kelly, Fairfield, NJ; Lost Legacy provided the references to Wealth Of Nations.]

Much of the confusion and misinformation about Adam Smith comes from attributions to him from people who either, or both, have not read Wealth Of Nations fully and rely only on quotations, or do not understand statements by Adam Smith on Natural Law, are from a theory of jurisprudence (following Grotius, Pufendorf, Carmichael, and Hutcheson), and are not just a theory of how to run a commercial system; Natural Law and Liberty applies to all societies.

Adam Smith On State Expenditures and Interventions

A correspondent asks:

“I'm still puzzled as to where Smith draws the line with regard to government intervention. In Book V, Chapter I, he talks about justice, defence and public works but it seems that he has a wider application for the state in market matters. I'd be very interested to hear your viewpoint on this.

To which I replied:

Yes, it is widely believed, even by some top academic economists, especially on Blogland, that Adam Smith favoured small government, often represented by the phrase, the 'night watchman state', which in fact was coined in the late 19th century by a firebrand socialist.

I have posted this list from my book, Adam Smith: a moral philosopher and his political economy' (2008, pp 247-48, Palgrave Macmillan):

"● The Navigation Acts, blessed by Smith under the assertion that ‘defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence’; (WN464)
● Sterling marks on plate and stamps upon linen and woollen cloth (WN138-9)
● Enforcement of contracts by a system of justice; (WN720)
● Wages to be paid in money, not goods;
● Regulations of paper money in banking; (WN437)
● Obligations to build party wars to prevent the spread of fire; (WN324)
● Rights of farmers to send farm produce to the best market (except ‘only in the most urgent necessity’);(WN 539)
● Premiums and other encouragements to advance the linen and woollen industries’; (TMS185)
● ‘Police’, or preservation of the ‘cleanliness of roads, streets, and to prevent the bad effects of corruption and putrifying substances’;
● ensuring the ‘cheapness or plenty [of provisions]’; (LJ6; 331)
● patrols by town guards, fire fighters and of other hazardous accidents; (LJ331-2)
● Erecting and maintaining certain public works and public institutions intended to facilitate commerce (roads, bridges, canals and harbours); (WN723)
● Coinage and the Mint; (WN478; 1724)
● Post office; (WN724)
● Regulation of institutions, such as company structures (joint stock companies; co-partneries, regulated companies); (WN731-58)
● Temporary monopolies, including copyright, patents, of fixed duration; (WN754)
● Education of youth (‘village schools’, curriculum design); (WN758-89)
● Education of people of all ages (tythes or land tax) (WN788);
● Encouragement of ‘the frequency and gaiety of publick diversions’; (WN796)
● The prevention of ‘leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive disease’ from spreading among the population; (WN787-88)
● Encouragement of martial exercises; (WN786)
● Registration of mortgages for land, houses, and boats over two tons; (WN861, 863)
● Government restrictions on interest for borrowing (usury laws) to overcome investor ‘stupidity’; (WN356-7)
● Laws against banks issuing low-denomination promissory notes; (WN324)
● Natural liberty may be breached if individuals ‘endanger the security of the whole society’; (WN324)
● Limiting ‘free exportation of corn’ only ‘in cases of the most urgent necessity’ (‘dearth’ turning into ‘famine’); (WN539)
● Moderate export taxes on wool exports for government revenue; (WN 879)

Jacob Viner concluded, unsurprisingly, that Adam Smith was not a doctrinaire laissez-faire advocate.

[From Viner, J. 1928. ‘Adam Smith and Laissez-faire’, In ‘Adam Smith, 1776-1928: Lectures to Commemorate the Sesquicentennial of the Publication of Wealth Of Nations, p 53, August M. Kelly, Fairfield, NJ; I provided the references to Wealth Of Nations.]

Second Question:

“How exactly does Smith make a distinction between permissible and unacceptable government intervention? I could justify some of this divergence by considering that much of his criticism of government involvement stems from actual experience rather than theoretical reasoning (which, if used, could rule out regulation all together!). What's your take on it?”

Smith, remember, wrote (Book V) of ‘public works and public institutions’ that ‘facilitated commerce’. It was, and I think, remains, an empirical test, not a theoretical outcome. Markets do not work because of theory, or ‘rational thought’, or who wrote books about it.

He didn’t sit down and think great thoughts about gaps in knowledge from his appreciation of the explanations of others and himself of real world events. That is the way of ‘shamans’, priests and inventors of religious explanations, with everything they cannot explain shunted into the mysteries of ‘invisible beings’ or gods.

The pure theory of markets, such as neoclassical economics and general equilibrium as much that it is meritorious, but it is a theory not a description of how markets actually work.

The players in markets are real human beings, not variables that operate within narrow confines of deterministic mathematics. Consider how Smith chided some of the Physiocrats (mentioning Dr Quesnay by name) for their apparent insistence that the ‘political body would thrive only under a precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty and perfect justice’… ‘if a nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered’. (WN IV.ix.28: p 674)

The message is clear: start with the history, how things arrived at their present day circumstances and arrangements, and observe how they operate, drawing on lessons of how they worked, more or less, well in the past and what that teaches us selectively about what works and what doesn’t, assemble general principles that seem to be of practical benefit to assumed goals, and apply them to current events and trends.

Of course, everything depends on the selection and the objectives. Machiavelli, the Italian political practitioner drew on history to show how rulers ruled in the past and selected common aspects that could apply to rulers in his present (1500s), where the objective function was to remain ‘safe’ in power.

Smith’s objective function was how an economy, the State, and the people, could spread opulence from commerce to the nation, especially the poor majority, drawing on how nations remained stable (justice and the distinction of ranks), became prosperous (the desire of people to ‘better themselves’) given as much freedom to do so (Liberty) without it degenerating into monopoly, restrictive protectionism, and opulence for a minority using their political influence over the State, while leaving the poor as they had been left throughout all history as serfs, slaves, and penurious labourers.

Smith believed that a commercial society was the best opportunity for continual growth and the spread of opulence, and showed in his critique of mercantile political economy, as it had operated since the 15th century and was operating up to the Fall of Rome in the 5th century, what changes might be made by the legislature to let commerce do its work as speedily as was practicable in the real world and not in some kind of impossible utopia.

He was not an ideologue. His understanding of history demonstrated what was possible among real men as they were, not ideal ‘guardians’ of public interest who usually made everything worse than it need be.

Hence, his proposals for ‘public works and public institutions’, which were written in is inimitable style, were apparently quite modest (the incorrect ‘take’ on them by laissez-faire ideologues), though they added to a level of state expenditure that was actually quiet ambitious, with separately argued cases for the items listed by Jacob Viner in 1928 above, which together extended the agenda of appropriate expenditure by a classical liberal state (and even one ran by quite illiberal personnel).