Actions Not Motives Cause Unintended Consequences
Karen Hedwig Backman posts
(10 December) on Daily Kos Here
“Counterfactual
Theory and the Invisible Hand of Intelligent Design”
… According
to David Lewis, if a and b are distinct events that actually occur,
then b causally depends on a if and only if a were not to occur, then b would
not occur either (1973a). If the match had not been struck, then it would not
have lit. ...
But, but, what
about the many times I have struck a match and the match has not lit. Varying
circumstances caused this to happen, a damp environment which discourages fire,
an abrasive surface for striking a match which is no longer abrasive, age and
decay of the chemicals in the matches. Holy Cow! Just because you strike a
match -- or friction it against a suitably rough surface -- does not mean that
it will burst into flame.
But, but, what
about the counter logic of counterfactual theory? I leap, like Zippy, into a
wonderful fairyland of conjectural bewilderment.
In the matter of a
and b and a causal relationship between the two, if the action of a occurs but
b does not result, what about the logic of the invisible hand and intelligent
design?
How did it all
happen? Why must it be so damned uncertain? If a match is struck, or rubbed frictionally
against an appropriately rough surface ... some matches are designed so that
they only ignite when rubbed frictionally against a specific chemically treated
surfaces, a markedly complex synergy which cancels out all a's as the cause of
b. I concede that b can still occur if the proper circumstances of a occur but
not always. That's as far as I'll go.
A possibility, but
nothing so firm as a probability.
Intelligent
design? Pishtah! Again, a possibility, remotely, but blind happenstance
prevails. Once in a while even the universe makes sense and is momentarily
certain.
Comment
I quote Karen Hedwig Backman’s short post because it deals
tangentially with a debate I am having with an anonymous correspondent on
“unintended consequences” and the metaphor of “an invisible hand”. Whereas the invisible hand as a
metaphor addresses the hidden, thereby invisible, motives of those merchants
who avoid foreign trade because of their perceived insecurity of their capital.
When their capital leaves their own country it is out of their sight in foreign
countries, of which they are less familiar with in respect of the honesty of
the people they must rely upon abroad and the uncertain legal systems that they
would necessarily depend upon to remedy any deficiencies in the probity of
their overseas partners. Hence,
they prefer to invest at home in “domestic industry, writes Adam Smith in
Wealth Of Nations (WN IV.ii.1-10: 452-456).
I have long criticised
modern interpretations of this paragraph and the assertions that follow about
the ‘unintended consequences’ as mentioned by Adam Smith. These disputes narrow
down to what the ‘invisible hand’ metaphor refers to.
I claim, following
Adam Smith, that all metaphors, refer to their “objects”. Smith wrote of them thus: “Metaphors
describe in a more striking and interesting manner their objects” in his
Lectures on Rhetoric, delivered during November 1762 and December 1763) (Smith,
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, 1983, p. 29. Oxford University
Press). This definition and
his examples conform to modern definition of metaphors in the definitive Oxford
English Dictionary (and as far as I have been able to check in all English
language dictionaries).
Clearly, the motives
of the merchant’s insecurity are the “object” addressed by the metaphor of “an
invisible hand”. It “describes in a more striking and interesting manner” the
object. No amount of wriggling can
get my anonymous critic off that hook.
The debate moved on to
another line of attack, specifically Smith’s reference to “unintended
consequences”, which my critic pretends to find a rescue for his/her crumbling
position. My critic claims that the “invisible hand” is a metaphor for the
‘unintended consequence’ of the merchant’s motives. This is illogical; it gets the relationship the wrong way
round.
The merchant’s motives
are private, hidden and cannot be seen by others – they are “invisible” to
others! But his actions, which are
the consequences of the merchants acting on his invisible motives, are visible:
they arithmetically increase “domestic revenue and employment”, as Smith
says. What is visible is not
comfortably expressed as a metaphor like “an invisible hand”.
To suggest, as some,
like my anonymous critic does, that ‘an invisible hand’ leads the merchant to produce
the “unintended consequences” identified by Adam Smith is to import into
economics a wholly mysterious “intentional force” that deliberately creates the
“unintentional consequences” of the merchant’s actions! A logical nonsense surely? I can only admire the cheek that is
introduced into economics by this virtual theological invisible force, which nobody can see or measure.
The sequence, I
suggest, is that the private motives of individuals lead them to actions and
these actions, not their motives, lead their visible actions to the visible “unintended
consequences”.
In Karen Hedwig
Backman’s presentation of David Lewis’s logic: “if a and b are distinct events that actually occur,
then b causally depends on a if and only if a were not to occur, then b would
not occur either”.
Now, if the
merchant’s insecurity was not present as the motive, he might export his
capital in the “foreign trade of consumption” and most certainly the arithmetic
increase in “domestic revenue and employment” that would occur if he had invested
his capital domestically. In short, if a did not occur then neither would b – because
if there is no motive, then there would be no action to avoid foreign investment,
and consequently there would not be c, in this case, the “unintended
consequences” of the action of investing in domestic industry.
What a host of
complications and, sad to say, outright fantasies, that would be avoided if
only modern economists wedded to “invisible hand” theology would carefully read
Adam Smith’s words and not jump to their unwarranted conclusions.
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