Milton Friedman and his Version of the 'Invisible Hand" Contested
From: The Journal of
Scottish Philosophy, 5 (2) 2007, 103–117 ISSN 1479–6651:
“INVISIBLE HAND ARGUMENTS: MILTON FRIEDMAN
AND ADAM SMITH
ALISTAIR M. MACLEOD (Queen’s
University Ontario)
When
I first read this paper recently** I was struck by Alistair Macleod’s specific
examination of Smith’s arguments regarding his use of the IH metaphor. This is a welcome change, but so far
few, if any, authors have followed Alistair Macleod’s more forensic approach. Instead most, if not all authors simply
assert the modern interpretations, for which Milton Friedman’s “Free to Choose”
(1980) was a major authority:
Alistair
Macleod:
“I turn now to consider the account of Smith’s invisible
hand argument offered by Milton Friedman in Free to
Choose. He writes:
“The key insight of
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations is that if an exchange between two parties
is voluntary, it will not take place unless both believe they will benefit from
it.
Adam Smith’s flash
of genius was his recognition that the prices that emerged
from voluntary
transactions between buyers and sellers – for short, in a free
market – could
coordinate the activity of millions of people, each seeking his
own interest, in
such a way as to make everyone better off. …
… “There are, however, some serious
objections to the invisible hand argument in the form in which it
is reconstructed by Friedman; and I have in mind here objections to the
argument itself, not objections to the claim Friedman makes that the
argument is the essential argument presented in The Wealth of Nations.”
Comment
Friedman
interprets Smith’s analysis of bargaining in the usual terms of self-interest
making every one better off, otherwise they could not agree to a bargain. To
address this argument properly would take more space than I can allocate in
this post, hence I refer readers to earlier posts "Adam Smith on Bargaining'.
Briefly,
Smith was more interested in how self-interested parties to an exchange
transaction could find an agreement.
He recommended that buyers seeking their dinner should address not their
own self-interests, but instead address the seller’s “self-love” by seeking to
persuade the sellers how much it was in their interests to sell their meat,
beer and bread at the price the buyer offered them, and not by appealing to whatever
buyer concerned themselves.
In
TMS he covered this in several places, broadly by highlighting how much
successful persuasion comes from addressing the interests of the other party in the discourse between them and
sellers (or vice versa). That is
why, in modern more experienced times, sellers waning to sell hair cream to buyers used the slogan: “a
little dab’ll do ya”, persuading by appealing to the potential buyers' sense of not wasting their money, and sellers of Mars Bars said: “Mars helps you work,
rest, and play”, persuading by appealing to buyers' wanting to benefit from the product's multiple services. In Smithian
terms, bargainers achieve their objectives of serving their own self-interests
by mediating the differences in self interests between them and not by asserting their own self-interests
only and disregarding what may appeal to the self-interests of the other party to the transaction.
Alistair Macleod in “iii. adam smith on the invisible hand” cites paragraphs: (WN IV ii: 6); (WN IV ii: 7); (WN IV ii: 9); and [110/11]
“According to this
passage, the end that is unintentionally served when individuals are given the
freedom to invest capital in ways of their own choosing is maximization of a
society’s gross economic product.” [112]
“In The Theory of
Moral Sentiments, the invisible hand is held to work its
magic, not by contriving to maximize the gross domestic product of a commercial
society, nor by distributing that product in a way which makes every member of
society “better off,” but by securing the sort of economic distribution which
ensures that the poor are provided with the necessities of life. (TMS IV i. 1.10).
Comment:
It is here that I
find that Alistair Macleod is least convincing.
In common with many
modern economists (and philosophers) the IH metaphor used by Smith “describes
in a striking and more interesting manner” the motivations of the parties that leads
them to act in the particular manner represented by the metaphor of “an
invisible hand”.
The resultant consequencies of their actions are quite separate from their motives, but their actions eventually have
“unintended consequences”, so it is pointless to summarise the “invisible hand”
in TMS (or indeed in WN), as “contriving’ to make everybody “better off” by
“distributing” or “securing” anything.
The whole point of “unintended” is precisely that the individuals have
no “intentions” besides their securing their immediate objectives of feeding
the landless labourers employed to labour in the landlord’s fields, or his
palaces and households, and to fight against his enemies. Without food there can be no labour from their serfs, no
“greatness”, and no life of luxury for themselves and their pampered
families. For this relationship to
be true, as it is, no theory of individual “rationality” was required; hence I
found Alistair Macleod’s long discussion of “rational maximizing quite
misleading, interesting as it may be.
I have seen Smith’s
“invisible hand” metaphor explained as a theory of “unintended consequences”, joining the astonishing and
invented idea of IH as a theory of “free markets”. What is “unintended” has no relevance as a theory of
”intentions” and Smith never mentions “markets”, free or perfect, or only
applying in such circumstances (Samuelson, 1948) in relation to the IH metaphor. The employment of serfs, slaves, or peasants since
“Providence divided the land” (TMS) unequally, i.e., it began a very long time ago, long
before any markets existed, or since the operation of mercantile foreign v
“domestic industry” decisions became relevant. The more recent invocation of the IH with “unintended
consequences” is wholly misleading too.
Alistair Macleod cites
IH paragraph (TMS IV i. 10):
“Whether these
desires are efficacious in bringing about serious commitment to arduous toil
only because action to satisfy such desires is believed to be required by the
principle of self-interest, or whether they move to action independently of
this belief, the important point is that their power and importance are in no
way dependent on the truth of such a belief.”
Comment
The “commitment to
arduous toil” is posed in too philosophical a manner. Adults laboured under the absolute necessity of their having
no independent source of subsistence. “Proud and unfeeling landlords” fed them
because they had no other source of acquiring and binding labourers to their crucial
and lowly roles. So subsistence
and suffering from their overseers, were the lot of labourers’ through the millennia.
When fed regularly,
the unintended consequence was the survival of new generations of labourers and
the “procreation of the species”.
The landlords’ (inescapable) need to supply subsistence (quantities and
qualities of that subsistence decided by the landlords’ overseers) eventually
had “unintended consequences”, as did the landlords’ beginning to divert their surplus annual expenditure on “luxury” goods for themselves and their families. This “enriched” the quality of their
families’ lives and also the incomes (and families) of those merchants and the
chain of manufacturers who supplied them with their “conveniences and
amusements”. Smith regarded the
beneficiaries of the production and consumption of these goods, which together
undermined the landlords’ ability to continue with the means to provide and
sustain their incomes and civil power, especially in relation to the growth of
towns and trade. Among the long-run
consequences of these trends was to give merchants and, eventually,
manufacturers, initially in north-west Europe but eventually across Europe and
North America, the base that undermined feudalism as unintentionally continued to build the international market economy.
Nobody intended that
to happen; it was never designed by anybody and neither was it due to a magical entity called “an invisible hand”. This metaphor remains Smith’s
description “in a striking and more interesting manner” (see Adam Smith, 1762.
“Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres”, p 29) the limited motivations that
led the players to act in the manner they did, without the slightest intention
of anything that happened as a consequence.
Nevertheless, I
found Alistair Macleod’s paper well worth reading because he takes some small
steps to understand what Adam Smith was about.
**
I found the PDF in an unused file with so many cobwebs on it that I couldn’t
remember from whence I got it. The
original source is dated as 2007, so I could have collected anytime from six
years ago, or somebody kindly sent it to me more recently and I do not appear
to have acknowledged it, for which lapse in good manners I apologise.
Alistair Macleod's paper is at: http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/jsp.2007.5.2.103
Alistair Macleod's paper is at: http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/jsp.2007.5.2.103
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