Society and Moral Sentiments
“Democracy
and Capitalism in Adam Smith’s Mutual Sympathy and Sociability”.
“I continue to
slowly wend my way through Adam Smith, both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, with the help of James R. Otteson (Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life) and
Ryan Patrick Hanley (Adam Smith and
the Character of Virtue). I’m finding it fascinating that Adam Smith’s
views on human psychology, as it impacts morality, seem so modern. About a
quarter of the way through his book, Otteson summarizes Smith’s psychology of
morality. There are two features which describe Smith’s views, the notion of
mutual sympathy; and sociability, the idea that humans are made to live in
society.
We desire mutual
sympathy, as Smith puts in the TMS (13); “nothing pleases us more than to
observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast;
nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary.” Through
this mutual sympathy, we attempt to win praise and avoid blame; but more
importantly, Smith believes, we seek to be praiseworthy and blameless. “Nature,
accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but
with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what he
himself approves of in other men.” (TMS, 117) If we want to be what we approve
of in other men, it is not that other men can appear praiseworthy even when
they are not; it is that we want to be praiseworthy like them.
Smith also thinks
that the characteristic of sociability is innate in human nature. We are born
dependent on others to survive, but more importantly, we have a psychological
need to be a part of community. It is in society that we are able to exercise
of sense of mutual sympathy; we need to be seen by others as praiseworthy and
blameless to be psychologically whole. Both the need for mutual sympathy, and
the innate characteristic of sociability, lead to the notion of the impartial
spectator, where we are able to judge ourselves by recognizing how others judge
us, just as we see them doing with us.
Otteson makes one
other point about Smith’s views in this summary. He notes that Smith believes
that in spite of mutual sympathy and sociability, we care more for ourselves
than for others, and more for those closest to us than for those most remote.
Man is driven by self-interest, as well as by sociability. Recognizing that
others also are driven by self-interest leads to the impartial spectator
procedure, since we realize we need to temper our own sentiments so that they are
seen as praiseworthy to others, and to give us the grounds to better understand
our fellows.
I also continue to
listen to the lectures on Political and Economic Thought by Professor Charles
Anderson. He describes Rousseau’s “general will” (la volonté générale) as being the means by which
individuals can give up some measure of autonomy by joining with a group on a
particular issue while still retaining their freedom of thought and action by
adopting the group’s opinion and feeling it as their own.
Otteson, noted
above, titles his book as the marketplace of life, and uses this idea of humans
interacting in the marketplace to describe both the development of our morals
and sensibilities as well as our economic life. Prof. Anderson’s describes
Smith’s views of individuals creating contracts with each other, but
maintaining individual freedom because the contracts are freely chosen. It
strikes me as being very close to Rousseau’s general will, individuals giving
over some measure of freedom by binding themselves to a contract, but
maintaining freedom because they freely choose to do so.
According to Prof.
Anderson, the theory of capitalism begins with Adam Smith, specifically with
the Wealth of Nations. The year was 1776. We often conflate democracy with
capitalism, and our modern political discourse often assumes that the role of
the state is to further capitalistic freedom. But the theory of capitalism and
Thomas Jefferson’s penning of the Declaration of Independence occurred in the
same year; Jefferson could not have been thinking capitalism when describing
government and the rights of individuals. Nor can one expect the Constitution
to be grounded on a theory of capitalism, so soon after The Wealth of Nations.
Still, democracy
feels like the marketplace; individuals come together, interact, form unions,
and create government. Prof Anderson notes that individuals coming together in
the marketplace gives form to community, society, and government without having
to predefine it. Similarly, democracy does not guarantee that we will do the
right thing, or the best thing. It is, in a sense, neutral; democracy does not
tell us what we ought to do, but rather merely provides the marketplace out of
which our politics grows.
Comment
JJ: “There are two
features which describe Smith’s views, the notion of mutual sympathy; and
sociability, the idea that humans are made to live in society.”
GK:
Humans, of the two
surviving species of the speciation from the common ancestor of chimpanzee apes
and humans formed their basic characteristics over long periods of time.
Basically, that involves a capacity for sociability, which has taken many forms
even in our short time in the historical chain. Humans were not “made for society”, as if a society of
humans is something in an unchanging stable form. It isn’t; it took and takes many forms across history and
geography, and can change dramatically throughout an individual’s
lifetime.
What sociability
means is the capacity to live in proximity with others, from dependence at
birth and infancy on immediate con-specifics, usually the mother or other close
relative, which can take varying forms of relationships with others in
life. How relationships change or
mature is a measure of the stability or otherwise of the sociability
appropriate for that group of people at their time and place. As a society changes, the form of
sociability appropriate for that group also changes. There are no unchanging contracts, which is why I sense that
the notion of a social contract (Rousseau’s “general will”) is unsound. People persuade or bargain but their
agreements are not settled for all time. New bargains are settled, force may be
resorted to, circumstances change, new classes form, and individuals act. The early migrations out of Africa were
replicated when Europeans discovered the America’s and migrated in large
numbers, and more recently, African migrate to Europe.
Smith’s Moral
Sentiments addresses relationships in 18th century Scotland. It was
not about “capitalism”. Smith had
no theory of “capitalism” (see previous post). Professor Charles Anderson is mistaken if Jacob Jefferson Jakes reports him correctly. Democracy came long after Adam Smith was writing (as late as
the 20th century in the UK with the female franchise) and possibly
only after the 1960s with the laggard situation in the “deep south”. While capitalism is widespread
throughout the world it would be hard to “conflate” it with “democracy” in most
of the rest of the world. Liberty
is more important than democracy, for without Liberty, so-called “democracy” in
many countries is a sham – think Zimbabwe, North Korea, Iran, and much of the
Middle-East (the full list is too long to compile).
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